Abstract. This paper considers a capital accumulation model that was previously analyzed by Barucci (1998) . The specific feature of the model is that revenue is a convex function of the capital stock. We extend Barucci's work by giving a full analytical characterization of the case where a saddle point with a positive capital stock level exists. Furthermore we also analyze the other cases.
Introduction
In this paper we study a standard capital accumulation model of the firm, where the objective is to maximize the discounted profit stream. The profit rate equals the difference between the revenue and the costs of investment. Revenue is obtained by selling goods on the market. The firm needs a capital stock to produce these goods. The higher the capital stock it owns , the more goods the firm produces, which in turn leads to a higher revenue. The firm can increase capital stock by investing. Technically spoken, this model is an optimal control model with one state variable, the capital stock, and one control variable, the investment rate.
The study of this framework goes back to the sixties, and started out with Eisner and Strotz (1963) . In this contribution the revenue function was assumed to be concave and investment costs were convex. Using standard methods of control theory it is easily shown that optimal firm behavior describes convergence to a unique long run equilibrium at which marginal revenue equals marginal costs. Later it was recognized (Rothschild (1971) ) that arguments could be found in favor of a (partly) concave shape of the investment cost function. The problems (chattering controls!) that then occur in the maximization problem were subject of study in Davidson and Harris (1981) and Jorgensen and Kort (1993) .
On the other hand it can also be the case that the revenue function is convexly shaped for some intervals of capital stock values. Such a scenario was studied in Dechert (1983) and again Davidson and Harris (1981) . From these contributions it can be concluded that partly convex revenue functions can lead to multiple equilibria. It then depends on the initial level of the capital stock to which of the equilibria it is optimal for the firm to converge to. In this sense we can speak of history dependent equilibria. Barucci (1998) studies the case where the revenue function is strictly convex throughout. He considered a framework where both the revenue function and the investment cost function are quadratic. As a result the isoclines, on which state, control, and co-state variables are constant, are linearly shaped, so that exactly one steady state exists. This means that multiple equilibria are ruled out. Barucci (1998) identifies the case where a saddle point equilibrium occurs for a positive level of the capital stock. He shows that convergence to this saddle point is the optimal policy.
Fascinated by the fact that such a simple optimal solution exists for the model with a fully convex revenue function, in this paper Barucci's framework is studied once again. We extend Barucci (1998) by (1) determining a full analytical characterization of the case with the saddle point with positive capital stock, and (2) by determining which other cases are also possible if the parameter values are different.
The contents of this paper is as follows. The model is formulated in Section 2. After establishing the necessary optimality conditions in Section 3, the equilibrium and its stability properties are studied in Section 4. In Section 5 all possible cases are studied, while some ideas for future research are outlined in Section 6.
Model formulation
Following Barucci (1998) , the model we consider is the following:
where k denotes the capital stock and u is investment. The revenue function is given by r(k) while the investment costs are c(u). The discount rate is ρ while µ denotes the depreciation rate. Although Barucci did not impose this constraint, for economic reasons (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1996) ) we assume that investments are irreversible:
In order to be able to obtain a full analytical solution, like Barucci (1998) we assume quadratic revenue and cost functions:
We require all parameters a, b, c, d, µ, and ρ to be positive. Hence, as already explained in the Introduction, the revenue function exhibits increasing returns to scale. To illustrate the importance of analyzing this framework, we can refer to, e.g., Hartl and Kort (1996) . In this paper a variant of the current model was studied where the revenue function is concave and pollution was included. Also a second control in the form of abatement expenditures was added. For this model it turned out that, after solving for abatement expenditures, an optimal control model results for which in one particular case the objective is strictly convex in k. In Hartl and Kort (1996) this scenario was not analyzed because it seemed to complicated at that time.
Investment costs include costs of acquisition and adjustment costs. In the next section it turns out that the strictly convex shape of the investment cost function implies that u is continuous over time.
Necessary conditions
To obtain the necessary conditions for optimality we start out by presenting the current value Hamiltonian:
From the maximum principle it is derived that:
If (3) is imposed, then (6) holds only for u > 0 i.e. for q > c. Otherwise we have
Since the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in u we know from, e.g., Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) that u is continuous over time. The adjoint equation is
From (6), i.e., q = 2du + c and (7) we get:
Equilibrium and its stability properties
The (unbounded) linear DE-system (2) and (8) has the following unique equilibrium:
On the other hand, the original canonical system (2) and (7) has the unique equilibrium
which is the same as Barucci's result on p. 794 except for a sign error in the second formula.
For economic reasons only positive equilibria k make sense. Then also k u µ = is positive, which in turn implies that then also
is positive too. Proposition 1: The unique equilibrium is in the relevant region (k > 0, u > 0, first quadrant) , iff the sign of ( ) a c − + µ ρ equals the sign of (2) and (8) is
so that the equilibrium is a saddle point iff
as was also found by Barucci (1998) ; see (i) on p. 794.
and the
Comparing this with (11) it follows that the 0 = k & -isocline is steeper than the 0 = u & -isocline iff the equilibrium is a saddle point.
Solution in the four different cases
From Proposition 1 we obtain, that the signs of the expressions (
are crucial for the outcome of the model. Consequently we can distinguish four different cases.
Case
In this case, from (9) we get a positive equilibrium, which is, by (11), a saddle point. Figure 1 clearly illustrates the reverse accelerator feature of the stable investment path as expressed in Dechert (1983) . This means that investment is lower the larger the difference between the steady state level and the current level of capital goods. The economic intuition behind this is that in this model marginal revenue increases with the capital stock so that investment is more profitable if the capital stock is large. 
We now compute the trajectories u(t) and k(t) along the saddle point path and evaluate the objective function. This is normally impossible, but here it can be done due to the fact that the functions r(k) and c(u) are quadratic (cf. (4)).
First, we have to obtain the eigenvalues associated with the Jacobian of the dynamic system (see section 4):
It is easily obtained that 1 λ is negative while 2 λ is positive. Since the solution of Figure 1 is stable only 1 λ must be considered.
Then we need to compute the eigenvector [k*, 1]' associated with this negative eigenvalue 1 λ and get the solution:
Taking once again the Jacobian of the dynamic system into consideration, the eigenvector is easily computed as follows:
which yields:
From (15) and (16) we generate the following expressions:
Then, with k k − = 0 α and
Evaluating the objective function (1) using this expression, we get: k is positive, and that the that the coefficient of k 0 is positive, i.e. the minimum of Π(k 0 ) occurs for an infeasible k 0 < 0. This is shown in Appendix 1.
Extensive numerical experiments have shown, that in Case 1 the net present value of profit is always positive. Unfortunately it turned out to be too difficult to derive this result analytically. If one wants to determine the parameter values a, b, c and d such that Π(0) is minimized, taking into account all the constraints that hold in Case 1 and the positivity of the parameters, then one can make Π(0) a positive number arbitrarily close to zero. In this case d is very large compared to all the other parameters and k approaches zero. If this Π(0) would not have been positive the solution that converges to the saddle point would have been dominated by a policy of zero investment throughout. The outcome of this exercise does not contradict Barucci's (1998) result (Proposition 4.1) that approaching the equilibrium is always optimal in Case 1.
In this case the equilibrium is not in the first quadrant and it is not a saddle point: 
The equilibrium with negative k and u is an unstable focus.
If (3) is imposed, u = 0 and k → 0 could be expected to be optimal when looking at the figure. However, for economic reasons it is clear that this is not true. Case 2 is characterized by large values of the parameters a and b occurring in the revenue function. In this case, approaching k = 0 is certainly not optimal.
In fact, no optimal solution exists, since the objective is unbounded. This will now be verified by showing analytically that constant or proportional investment rates can yield arbitrarily high values of (1)
Constant Investment
We first consider a constant investment policy u(t) = u* for all t.
Then the capital stock develops according to
Evaluating the profit using these expressions, we get: 
Thus, the objective (1) can be made arbitrarily large, if the constant u* is chosen large enough, provided that
Barucci shows that the objective is unbounded for
which is a weaker condition.
Proportional Investment
We now consider a constant investment policy
Substitution of this expression into (2) yields that the capital stock develops according to
Evaluating the profit function using these expressions, we get:
which is again used to evaluate the objective function (1):
However (1) is infinite for 2ε ≥ ρ. In particular, it is +∞ if
So (1) is unbounded, provided that
This lower bound is better than that obtained for constant investment, but still above the Barucci boundary.
Case
In this case the equilibrium is not in the first quadrant and it is a saddle point: This case is characterized by small values of the parameters a and b occurring in the revenue function. In this case, approaching k = 0 is certainly optimal. Note that k = 0 will not be reached in finite time.
Although in this particular case the parameters in the revenue function are small compared to those of he investment cost function, small investment expenditures will still be profitable if k is sufficiently large. This is true because marginal revenue increases linearly with k. Therefore, u will be positive for large values of k , but definitely zero for low values of the capital stock; see Figure 3 .
Allowing for reversibility of investment
Since Figure 3 shows that u = 0 at a final time interval, it makes sense to consider the scenario here, where constraint (3) is replaced by the state constraint k ≥ 0. Then the optimal trajectory in the phase diagram would converge to k = 0 within finite time. This is sketched in Figure 3a . Note that disinvestment does occurs here.
The proof is the same as in Example 8.8 on p.219 in Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) . 
In this case the equilibrium is in the first quadrant and it is not a saddle point: The equilibrium is an unstable focus. Except for the fact that the equilibrium now occurs for positive values of k and u this case is identical to Case 2.
No optimal solution exists, and the objective is unbounded. The calculations in Section 5.2 concerning constant and proportional investment, respectively, also apply to this case. 
Directions for future research
In this paper the standard capital accumulation model, but then with a strictly convex revenue function, was studied. Due to the quadratic specifications of the revenue and investment cost function, interesting results could be generated. A straightforward extension is to make the revenue function a third order polynomial in which k 3 is multiplied with a negative parameter. In this way a convex-concave revenue function arises which makes it possible to redo the calculations of Dechert (1983) and Davidson and Harris (1981) . As already mentioned in the Introduction, they arrived at solutions with multiple equilibria. They could identify levels of the capital stock, which we now call DNS (Dechert Nishimura Skiba)-points, where the firm is indifferent concerning to which equilibrium it should converge. Hopefully, it is possible to generate additional insights concerning these DNS-points in case we study the model with such a third order polynomial as revenue function.
A second interesting extension is to combine the just described convex-concave revenue function with introducing adjustment costs on changes in the investment rate (see Jorgensen and Kort (1983) , Section 3.4.2). In such a model investments will be introduced as a second state variable, and the rate of change of investment is the control variable. Hence, the resulting model now contains two state variables and one control variable. It can be expected that also here multiple steady states exist. Depending on the location in the (k,u)-plane, it is optimal to converge to one of these steady states. It would be interesting to study whether so-called DNScurves (which are DNS-points in a one-state-variable-model) exist, on which the firm is indifferent concerning to which steady state to converge to. 
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